LAW, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND EXPRESSION
STEPHEN GARDBAUMt

One of the great merits of this Symposium has been to identify
and clarify the important distinction between the concepts of incommensurability and incomparability. Broadly speaking, the distinction
reflects that between cardinal and ordinal rankings. That is, if two
options are incommensurable, they cannot precisely be measured and
ranked against each other by a single scale of value. However, incommensurability does not entail that the two options cannot be
compared at all, or ranked as better or worse than the other. Incomparability, conversely, means that even this latter ordinal ranking is
impossible. As the various contributions amply have illustrated, this
distinction, and the general subject of incommensurability that can
be said to include both concepts, have important implications for
moral reasoning, practical reasoning, and public policy.
The general issue also has important implications for political
reasoning, for if the incommensurability of competing ways of life
does not prevent their comparability and ordinal ranking, so that one
can nonetheless be said to be better than another, this would be a
conclusion of some significance in contemporary debates concerning
the nature and justification of liberal theory. It would, for example,
bolster the claims of political perfectionism, the general structure of
which is that if one way of life is better than others, the state has reason to promote it.2 By contrast, the incomparability of ways of life
might supplement the argument for the more impartial stance on the
part of the state that has come to be known as "political liberalism."3
t Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Arizona College of Law.
In her oral presentation, Ruth Chang expressed a particularly clear statement of
this distinction. For further discussion, see Ruth Chang, Introduction, in INCOMMENSURABILITY, INcOMPARABILiY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 1, 1-4 (Ruth Chang ed.,

1997).
2 For Joseph Raz, "perfectionist doctrine ...
holds the state to be duty-bound to
promote the good life." JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALrIY OF FREEDOM 426 (1986).

" Proponents of political liberalism generally do not rely on incomparability, but
rather on the fact of reasonable disagreement among citizens concerning different
ways of life, which they contend renders a partisan stance on the part of the state unjustified. See Charles Larmore, PoliticalLiberalism, 18 POL. THEORY 339, 340 (1990)
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In addition to the concepts of incommensurability and incomparability, there is a third important concept that is sometimes confused
with these two, particularly in the context of political theory where it
has been employed influentially. This third concept is the incompatibility of values, and it was famously relied upon by Isaiah Berlin in
his critique of monistic political thought.4 The concept of value incompatibility underlies that of value pluralism in that it is the incompatibility of different values that accounts for their irreducibility and
distinctiveness. Incompatibility, however, is not the same as either incommensurability or incomparability, because to claim that values are
irreducibly plural is not itself to claim anything about whether or how
they can be measured, compared, or ranked. Thus, to assert, for example, that liberty is distinct from, and cannot be reduced to, equality
is not to assert that liberty cannot be more important or valuable than
equality (as Berlin seems ultimately to have believed),5 but rather that
we cannot have everything. More generally, value incompatibility and
pluralism does not imply that there can be no justified choice between options expressing those values; it means that even if there is a
justified choice, some moral loss will still inevitably be involved. By
contrast, incommensurability and incomparability directly raise the
issue of the possibility of justified choice. Value pluralism by itself,
indeed, on some acthen, is not inconsistent with perfectionism;
6
of it.
counts it is a necessary condition

The incomparability of values would appear to provide a number
of additional reasons beyond value pluralism for such a characteristic
liberal practice as expressive freedom. Thus, if forms or ways of life
are incomparable and not merely incompatible, so that their relative
worth cannot be evaluated, this would seem to call into question a

("[W]hether the different forms of the good can be ranked, and if so how, is one of
the items about which reasonable disagreement tends to thrive."). Whether the fact of
incomparability, which would make such disagreement no longer reasonable, would
radically change the claims of political liberalism is an interesting issue.
See ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 54 (1958) ("[T] he belief that some
single formula can in principle be found whereby all the diverse ends of men can be
harmoniously realized is demonstrably false. If, as I believe, the ends of men are
many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the possibility of conflict-and of tragedy-can never wholly be eliminated from human life,
either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute claims is then
an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.").
- See id.at 55 ("[L] iberty to choose ... must be weighed against the claims of many
other values .... For this reason, it cannot be unlimited.").
6 See RAZ, supra note 2, at 398 (arguing that the perfectionist ideal of personal

autonomy requires value pluralism).
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number of traditional justifications for entrusting the choice among
them to a social, political, religious, or intellectual elite rather than to
the citizenry as a whole. Robust freedom of expression then might be
viewed as necessary for promoting informed and deliberative collective self-government. Moreover, apart from this issue of who does the
choosing, the incomparability of values should lead to greater importance being attached to the act of choice itself-and its preconditions-absent the external "coercive" force of compelling reasons.
Again, in this context, robust freedom of expression might be understood as critical for promoting autonomy and the capacity to exercise
choice.7 On the other hand, incomparability arguably undermines
one traditional argument for freedom of expression-that it is the
means to truth-since no amount of discussion will render two incomparable options comparable.
Although the two excellent articles upon which I am commenting
do not address the implications of incommensurability for political
reasoning, but rather address its implications for contractual and
moral reasoning, they both raise the connection between incommensurability and expressive conduct more generally. In An Expressive
Theory of Contract, Professor Gillian Hadfield argues that value pluralism and incommensurability compel recognition of the expressive
dimension of contractual choice. 8 By contrast, in Incommensurable
Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness ofFraud, Professor Alan Strudler
argues that there is no necessary link between incommensurability
and expressive concerns, and that in practice such a link is far more
the exception than the rule.9

In her important and provocative article, Professor Hadfield presents a reconceptualization of the source of contractual obligation
The instrumental connection between freedom of expression and autonomy
should not be understood as ruling out the possibility that this latter value is best
promoted by focusing primarily on the autonomy of hearers rather than speakers. See
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Broadcasting,Democracy, and the Market, 82 GEO. L.J. 373, 380-82
(1993) (offering several justifications for granting priority to the autonomy of hearers
7

rather than speakers).

8 See Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From FeministDilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 1261-63
(1998).
9 See Alan Strudler, Incommensurable Goods, Rightful Lies, and the Wrongness of Fraud,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1564-66 (1998) (refuting the existence of"a general connec-

tion between self-expression and incommensurables").
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that, she argues, provides a solution to the feminist dilemma of
choice: namely, how to protect women from the oppressive consequences of harmful, constrained choices without thereby divesting
them of full and equal contractual agency.' ° Her vehicle in this enterprise is a conception of choice in contract law that takes into account the plurality and incommensurability of value and provides an
alternative to the dominant rational choice model.
Drawing on the concept of expressive rationality developed by the
philosopher Elizabeth Anderson," Hadfield argues that contrary to
the conventional doctrine, which squeezes diverse forms into the
straitjacket of a single model, there are at least two types or categories
of contracts. These are, first, those that typically are entered into in a
risk-allocation frame of mind, based on the party's weighing of the
expected costs and benefits of contracting; and, second, those that
are entered
into for expressive rather than such instrumental rea12
sons. Hadfield illustrates this distinction by reference to three particular examples of expressive contracts which raise the feminist dilemma in stark terms: surrogacy contracts, marital separation
agreements, and a wife's guarantee of her husband's business debts.'
The major implication of this distinction, according to Hadfield, is
that what she characterizes as the standard logic and justification of
contract enforcement-the mere fact that "she chose"--does not apply in the case of expressive contracts, as the promisor did not in fact
choose to assume a risk about the future; this is not what
4 she understood herself to be doing when she entered the contact.'
This is an extremely interesting argument, and I have two initial
comments on it. First, particularly once one attempts to generalize
away from the three particular types of expressive contracts discussed
in the article, as Hadfield does in her conclusion, it strikes me that
more needs to be said about the division between the two categories
10See Hadfield, supra note 8, at 1248. Hadfield expresses the dilemma as follows:

Under current law, "[w]hen a woman seeks release from a harmful contract, she argues that she is exceptionally diminished in her capacity to assume responsibility for her
choices." Id.
" See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1743 (1993)
(presenting an expressive theory of rational action); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, SlingingArrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121, 2127 (1990) (offering an alternative, expressive
conception of the structure of rationality to social choice theory that the authors claim
.rests on peculiar conceptions of rationality and of democratic politics").
12 See Hadfield, supra
note 8, at 1261-63.
See id at 1263-76.
H See id. at 1281-82.
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of contracts. This is because there often may be a difference between
the reasons for which one enters a contract and what the promisor
understands herself to be doing in entering it. The "frame of mind"
in which one enters the contract plausibly may be said to encompass
both. So, for example, a friend may lend me money or invest capital
in a business idea of mine in order to express her sense of our friendship, while still thinking of it as a business transaction in the sense of
expecting to be repaid or rewarded. Does she enter this contract in a
risk-allocation frame of mind or an expressive one? Or take the example of a fully informed and contractually sophisticated spouse who
nonetheless enters into a guarantee to express faith in her marriage
and/or her partner's business acumen. Such examples suggest that
the division between expressive and instrumental modes of entering a
contract may not always or typically be alternatives,but instead may reflect different dimensions that are both present in a given contract:
the motivating reason for creating the obligation, and the practical
consequences one understands and expects to follow from it. Where
both dimensions are present, I think the argument-that the normal
contract rationale for enforcement does not apply-is incomplete.
Perhaps it is necessary to determine which is the dominant frame of
mind. On the other hand, if only purely instrumental contractsthose in which no expressive element is present at all-are subject to
the normal rule, this would constitute a far more radical reconstruction of contract law than Hadfield appears to contemplate or desire
in her article. Many commercial contracts, including (but not limited
to) relational ones,15 have some expressive dimension.
Second, in drawing her distinction, Hadfield equates expressive
choice with present-orientation and instrumental choice with futureorientation. It is because expressive choice is linked to the present
rather than the future that the "you chose" justification for contract
6
enforcement does not work in the case of expressive contracts. I am
a little unsure, however, about the validity-or, indeed, the necessity-of this equation and thus the consequent critique of the standard enforcement rationale. It seems to me that expressive choice

" On relational contracts generally, see IAN MACNEIL, THE NEW SOcIAL CONTRACr
(1980).

'6 See Hadfield, supra note 8,at 1262 ("If the reason for pointing at the goods in
the window was present-oriented and not made with a view to choosing a desired future-if the promise-making was expressive and not instrumental-what is the rationale for requiring a state of affairs to follow if, when the future comes, our chooser now
says she does not wish to choose accordingly?").
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may be (and often is) future-oriented, even if not oriented to future
risk allocation. This is because part of the expressive force of a person's entry into a contract may stem from the fact that she is binding
herself for the future and will be held to her promise. Being bound
may be an essential part of what she is expressing, and thus may represent a different expressive choice than merely a present intention to
do something in the future--or a choice without any reference to the
future. So, for example, an intrinsic part of the expressive choice
made in a separation agreement may be being bound by it in the future. Such a choice perhaps expresses more independence from the
former spouse than one that is purely present-oriented. In the case of
the guarantee of business debts, choosing to enter into a contract in
which the house is knowingly at stake may express more trust in the
marriage than one in which the house is not at stake. Where being
bound in the future is an essential part of what a person is expressing
when entering into a contract, there may then be a reason to enforce
the contract in the normal way: This is part of the expressive choice
the person made. She chose to bind herself in the future even if for
expressive and not risk-allocation reasons-that is, for reasons other
than that the expected benefits outweigh the expected costs.
Indeed, in her conclusion, Hadfield suggests how the analysis of
relational contracts and their enforcement is enhanced by the expressive theory of choice. 7 Yet relational contracts are, of course, even
more future-oriented than traditional, discrete ones.
In terms of the reconstruction of contract law that acknowledging
the expressive nature of much contract formation involves, Hadfield
argues that there are two better reasons for enforcement of expressive
contracts than the traditional "she chose" reason: namely, the reliance interest and institutional policy.1 Moreover, at least in the contexts of surrogacy and marital separation agreements, very often neither of these two reasons will justify enforcement, so that women will
be protected from the contracts' oppressive consequences without
losing full contractual agency. Importantly, such protection would be
the result of contractual logic itself rather than special relief from, or
limitation of, such logic. 9

See id.at 1284.
i See id. at 1269. "Institutional policy" refers to the value of, and the effects of
17

nonenforceability on, a given institution--such as the institution of mortgage guarantees.
"

See id. at 1280.
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In the specific case of mortgage guarantee contracts, however,
Hadfield argues that enforcement should be the norm. She proposes the general rule that reliance damages will be paid in the event
of breach unless the bank either failed to explain the details of the
agreement itself or failed to require that the spouse receive inde21
pendent legal counsel . Of course, under the current regime, the
bank relies upon the guarantee only because of its background
knowledge that the legal system will enforce the contract in the event
of default: Either the bank will receive a presumably profitable rate
of interest in the case of compliance, or a house that is worth more
than the amount of the loan in the case of default. But under a reliance-damage rule, the bank may receive less than this in the case of
default. If one assumes that such mortgages are more profitable than
the next-best alternative use of the bank's funds, then reliance damages, the purpose of which is to put the bank in the position it would
have been in absent the contract, would be equivalent to the amount
of the unpaid loan plus some lesser rate of profit. To the extent that
this would be the consequence of switching from expectation to reliance damages, then such a switch could have the effect of endangering the availability and institution of such mortgages. Banks might
charge a higher rate of interest to make up the difference or might be
more reluctant to enter into the mortgages. Thus, there could be
some measure of conflict between the two reasons for enforcement
that Hadfield proposes as better justified rationales than "she
chose'-reliance and institutional policy-and it would then be necessary to determine the priority between them.
Turning to more general considerations, I wonder to what extent
Hadfield's alternative theory of contract enforcement based on the
notion of expressive rather than instrumental choice actually does or
should rely upon the incommensurability thesis at all. For Elizabeth
Anderson and Richard Pildes, the plurality and incommensurability
of values are an essential part of their general critique of rational

See id. at 1267.

21 This, incidentally, would be an example of a situation where the contract is en-

tered into for expressive rather than instrumental reasons, but with full knowledge of
risk allocation. As such, I think Hadfield's argument that the normal justification for
enforcement does not work is incomplete. Why does the expressive reason for entering the contract trump knowledge of its consequences? See supra text accompanying
note 15.
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choice theory.2 But in the way, and for the purposes, that Hadfield
employs the notion of expressive choice, it is unclear to me if expressive choice depends on the incommensurability of values or is rather
to be understood more simply as a different frame of reference for
entering certain types of contracts as a descriptive matter. Thus, a
person might enter a surrogacy contract for expressive reasons rather
than instrumental ones, whether or not incommensurable values are
involved. Moreover, one reason that Hadfield might prefer the latter
account and limit her reliance on Anderson and Pildes-and hence
the general incommensurability thesis-is that unlike them, she is not
(as I understand it) challenging the general coherence of rational
choice's conception of rationality, but rather its monopoly. Hadfield
does not wish to undermine the general institution of commercial
contracts, which she states rests on the rational choice model, but
rather seeks to distinguish such contracts from expressive ones in
terms of the appropriate and justified reasons for enforcement. By
contrast, although Anderson and Pildes's primary goal is to undermine the claims of rational choice as an appropriate model of rationality in political and collective decisionmaking, they do so by using
the incommensurability thesis to undermine its general coherencein all contexts, including private, individual decisionmaking.
It is
not, for them, solely a problem of imperialism.
Finally, I wonder whether the solution that Hadfield offers to the
dilemma of choice is the only possible solution and, if not, why it
might be thought preferable. The dilemma itself, once again, is that
either women are held to their contractual commitments in constrained choice situations such as the three highlighted in her article,
or they are granted special protection from the normal rules of contractual enforcement, in which case they lose their full contractual
agency. The structure of Hadfield's solution is to replace the ad hoc
nature of nonenforcement (which gives rise to a sense of "special protection") with a new, general theory of expressive contracts containing its own distinctive rationales for enforceability. Expressive contracts are contracts that may or may not be enforceable depending on
whether either of the two rationales for enforcement is satisfied.

SeePildes & Anderson, supra note 11, at 2143 ("[T]his claim that values are irreducibly plural undermines the vision of rationality lying at the heart of social choice

theory.").
See id. ("The central claim of this Part is that social choice theory's conception of
rationality fails to acknowledge the fundamental plurality of values at stake in private
and public choices." (emphasis added)).

1998]

LAW, INCOMMENSURABILITY, AND EXPRESSION

1695

Nonenforcement under the expressive theory does not entail loss of
agency. Another solution, however, which adopts the same basic
structure, would be to deny that expressive contracts are contracts at
all in situations where enforcement is not justified. This similarly
would preserve contractual agency, because the contract formation
rules pertaining to expressive contracts would (like Hadfield's enforcement rationales) also be general ones, part of the new contractual logic rather than an ad hoc departure from, or limitation of, it.
Moreover, this second solution would fit reasonably comfortably
within traditional consideration doctrine on the basis that promises
made for expressive reasons are not exchanges. Is anything gained by
insisting that expressive contracts are contracts even where they are
not enforceable, so long as their nonenforceability is based on a general contractual logic rather than on a "special" exemption from that
logic?
II
In his rich and carefully argued article, Professor Strudler defends
the counterintuitive proposition that lawful (nonfraudulent) lying by
lawyers about their clients' reservation prices in certain common circumstances does not violate any relevant moral principles, so that
there is no necessary conflict between law and morality on this issue.
Strudler employs the argument for the moral permissibility of such
lying to illustrate his broader thesis that normative deliberation
among a set of options very often involves a judgment about incommensurable values-in particular, morally acceptable and morally
tainted values-rather than a calculation of which option provides
21
more of a single, shared value. Moreover, Strudler argues, his analysis of the lying example, and of the type of normative deliberation it
involves, indicates that reasoning about incommensurables is a much
more ordinary and common part of moral deliberation than much of
the legal literature suggests.25
My sense is that the article's most general and ambitious claimabout the frequency of incommensurables in normative deliberation-turns, to a significant extent, on the particular conception of
incommensurability employed by Strudler, or (more precisely given
the distinction discussed at the beginning of this Comment) on the
fact that his conception is more one of incommensurability than in24

See Strudler, supra note 9, at 1534-35
See id. at 1564-66.
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comparability. In making this observation, I do not at all intend to
26
suggest that Strudler's conception is idiosyncratic, but merely to reiterate that incommensurability is different from incomparability and
to point out that since the former is almost certainly more common
than the latter, which of the two is employed may well help to explain
the perceived frequency of incommensurable options in moral deliberation.
For Strudler-as for a number of others involved in debates on
the subject 7 -if two normative options are incommensurable, it does
other. 28
not follow that one option cannot be morally better than the
It means, rather, that they do not share some single desirable property or kind of value, so that determining which option is the morally
better one is not a process of comparing which has more of this property or value.2 But this emphatically is not to say that other ways

to compare incommensurable options do not exist. In particular,
Strudler contends, where one of the options contains morally acceptable value and the other contains morally tainted value, as in the case
of a less wealthy society without the institution of slavery and a wealthier society with slavery, the first option is morally better and provides
the only justified choice.30 It is the morally better option, but not be-

cause it has more of a particular shared property or value than the
other.31 In this way, there can be a morally right answer when choosing between incommensurable options.
32
As Strudler acknowledges, this conception of incommensurability is different from that employed by Joseph Raz, for example, in
which reason runs out among incommensurable options and there is
Indeed, Strudler has persuaded me in conversation that the conception of incommensurability he employs is in line with the dominant one (or ones) in the philosophical literature on the subject. See, e.g., HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL
26

REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 103-05 (1994) (arguing that value commensurability
obtains only when we can compare goods in terms of the degree to which they share
some desirable characteristic as a basis for making a choice among them); MICHAEL
STOCKER, PLURAL AND CONFLICTING VALUES 214-18 (1990) (stating that incommensurability obtains where there is no common unit of value in terms of which items can
be measured, but this does prevent justified choice among incommensurables based
on the absolute, "concrete" merits of the chosen alternative).
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 26.
28 See Strudler,supra note 9, at 1531-37.
29 See id.
0 See id. at 1535-36.
31

See id.

32

See id at 1533 n.12 (contrasting his own "cognitive" account of incommensur-

ability with the "voluntarist" view of Raz).
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no one choice that is uniquely justified 3 For Raz, we instead choose
among incommensurables as an act of will or for expressive reasons.
Such choice may indeed have its own rationality, but one that is
agent-centered rather than determined by the options themselves.This second conception, which is really a conception of incomparability, implies that incommensurable options cannot be rationally compared at all-their relative worth cannot be assessed. As we have
seen, for Strudler, they can be compared, but not quantitatively; that
is, not on the basis that one has more of a shared property than another. 3s Thus, slavery can be compared with nonslavery and found
wanting morally because it violates deontological norms. 6 A slightly
different way of putting the same point is that, for Strudler, normative
deliberation among options is either about "moreness" or else it is incommensurable. For Raz, by contrast, two options are not necessarily
incommensurable where normative deliberation between them is not
about moreness; rather, incommensurability exists where there is no
basis for justified choice at ally. Unlike the choice between tea and
coffee,-n Raz would not deem the choice between slavery and nonslavery an incommensurable one.
I do not belabor this point because I think it is a necessary-or
even a useful-enterprise to decide which conception of incommensurability best deserves the label, or to defend the use of one rather
than the other. Indeed, it is precisely the great merit of acknowledging the distinction between incommensurability and incomparability
that such questions to some extent can be avoided. Nonetheless, the
two conceptions have different implications for the issues of the fres See RAZ, supra note 2, at 322 ("A and B are incommensurate if it is neither true
that one is better than the other nor true that they are of equal value."). I believe that
Elizabeth Anderson also employs this conception of incommensurability, or something close to it. See Pildes &Anderson, supranote 11, at 2158-59 ("When the sources
of competing values at stake in political choices are very diverse, individuals sometimes
cannot judge either that one option is better than another or that the options are
equal. These are situations of radical incommensurability.... [1]n the face of radically
incommensurable options, that a choice has been made cannot always be taken to
mean that a value judgment has also been reached about the relative worth of the two
options.").
s4 See RAZ, supra note 2, at 388 ("Choice between incommensurables is undetermined by reason. When we choose we choose for a reason. Whichever option we
adopt we do so because of the factors which make it attractive.").
'" See Strudler, supra note 9, at 1531-37.
'6 See id. at 1535-36.

s See RAZ, supra note 2, at 322.

See id. at 328-29 (explaining that coffee and tea are insignificant incommensurables).
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quency of incommensurable options and the role of will in deciding
among them, and making this explicit helps us to understand how
Specifically, Strudler's use of a
and why the positions differ.
"cognitive" conception of incommensurability explains why deliberation among incommensurables is so normal or routine; many normative judgments involve us in nonquantitative reasoning among options, whatever we think about the further question of whether the
choice that we make can be rationally justified. Moreover, I suspect
this also explains much of Strudler's disagreement with Cass Sunstein
about how central the practice of expressive choice is with respect to
For Strudler, the possibility of a
incommensurable options.9
uniquely justified choice is not eliminated by acknowledging that one
is choosing among incommensurables.4 0 But, to the extent that Sun-

stein employs the Razian conception of incommensurability (that is,
incomparability), this possibility is eliminated, so that the actual
choice made can only be justified on the basis of will or expression,
rather than the balance of moral reasons. 41
The conclusion of Strudler's substantive discussion of the issue of
lying by lawyers about reservation prices is that, contrary to the standard view, such lying is morally permissible, at least under certain
fairly common circumstances, and its fruits are therefore not morally
tainted. 42 In a sense, this conclusion is a little curious given Strudler's
larger ends in his article, because it seems to follow that the choice
between lying and truth-telling is not a choice between incommensurables after all, and yet the example is intended to illustrate how
frequent and mundane choices among incommensurables are. But
putting this unimportant point aside, his conclusion sets up a conflict
between two morally untainted courses of action-obtaining more
money for one's client by lying about reservation prices and obtaining
less by not lying-and yet at this critical point, Professor Strudler's
analysis appears to provide little guidance on the issue of how we
should approach the task of resolving it.
39 Professor Strudler argues that it is melodramatic of Professor Sunstein to insist
that choice among incommensurables is always an expressive or existentialist choice.
See Strudler,supra note 9, at 1564-66.
40 See id. at 1531-37.
" See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUsTIcE 91-92 (1997)

(explaining the grounds for endorsing the expressive function of law); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 805-08 (1994)
(discussing the relationship between Sunstein's and Raz's understanding of incommensurability).
42 See Strudler, supra note 9, at 1561-64.
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It is certainly both true and very helpful to have so clearly demonstrated that many decisions we face involve options containing different kinds of value so that moral deliberation among them cannot be a
process of "moreness." Further, if some of these options contain
morally tainted value, we can exclude them from further consideration-perhaps, if we are lucky, we can exclude all options except one.
Strudler's account, however, does not seem to tell us very much in
situations, such as the lying example on which he focuses, where both
options (or more than one option) have passed muster under the
various deontological tests he posits. From a moral perspective,
should we lie if this will give our client more money? Is the deliberation now purely commensurable? Strudler's analysis tells us that we
can rationally choose between options when one is morally excluded,
but does not provide obvious guidance when one is not.
Moreover, in his analysis, options appear to be either morally acceptable or not. But surely there are cases, including arguably the lying case, where options are more or less acceptable. Even if lying is
morally permissible, isn't it always, or usually, still better not to lie? If
so, how then do we decide between the two options with their corresponding dollar figures?
Turning finally to a more technical point, toward the beginning
of his article, Strudler states that commensurability does not imply
consequentialism and that there is no inconsistency in a Kantian being a commensurabilist. 43 By the end of his article, I found myself
wondering whether he believes that incommensurability implies
commitment to deontology. The considerations of autonomy and
fairness that Professor Strudler employs in the lying context to determine whether an option is morally acceptable are exclusively deontological. But he does not address the issue of whether there might
be other, nondeontological considerations in contexts other than the
lying one. Must morally acceptable options be considered in purely
deontological terms? In other words, does Strudler think a deontological framework is necessary for his general incommensurability
thesis, or does he, rather, independently believe in this framework
and as a result not consider alternatives? I do not think accepting
consequentialist notions of morality is necessarily inconsistent with
his general thesis that morally valuable options, including those justified on consequentialist grounds, are incommensurable with morally
unacceptable ones. If an option is morally unacceptable, it does not

4

See id.at 1532 n.8.
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appear to matter on what particular ground this is so. If lying is morally wrong on consequentialist grounds, I see nothing to prevent one
from arguing that it is still an unacceptable option and therefore
cannot be compared with a morally acceptable one.

